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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5972 
GLOVERSVILLE-JOHNSTOWN JOINT 
SEWER BOARD, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
1
 By letter dated July 28, 2010, United Public Service Employees Union disclaimed any 
representational interest in the unit. 
Certification - C-5972 - 2 -
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Cleaner, Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP) Attendant, Motor 
Equipment Operator, Industrial Waste Monitoring Supervisor, 
Industrial Waste Monitoring Technician, WTP Laboratory 
Technician, Industrial Monitoring Mechanic, Motor Equipment 
Maintenance Mechanic, Senior WTP Maintenance Mechanic, WTP 
Maintenance Mechanic, Lead WTP Operator, WTP Operator 
Trainee, WTP Operator and Account Clerk Typist. 
Excluded: WTP Maintenance Supervisor, Fiscal Officer, Senior Plant 
Operator, Laboratory Director, Industrial Engineer, Plant 
Superintendent, Administrative Aide, Manager Wastewater 
Programs and/or Chief Operating Officer. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamster Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York 
/t/T^tryy^^-
Jerome Lefkowitz/Chairrru 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
ADJUNCTS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5979 
NIAGARA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Niagara County Community College 
Adjuncts Association, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon 
by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5979 -2 
Included: All part-time Instructors who teach at least three credit hours. 
Excluded: Part-time Instructors who exclusively teach in the summer, 
managerial/confidential employees and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Niagara County Community College Adjuncts 
Association, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York 
yOMTYhS^-
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Sheila S. Cfole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5983 
RIDGE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5983 
Included: All regular full-time and regular part-time EMT and paramedic 
employees and regular weekly per diem and regular monthly per 
diem EMT and paramedic employees. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York 
'J/iAryfr^ 
Jerome Lefkowi^, Chairman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5965 
TOWN OF 1SL1P, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
") 
Certification - C-5965 - 2 -
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All Blue Collar titles set forth in "Schedule A" annexed hereto. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5969 
TOWN OF ISLIP, 
Employer. 
KOEHLER & ISAACS LLP (HOWARD WIEN, ESQ., of counsel) for Petitioner 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (ERNEST R. STOLZER, ESQ., of 
counsel) for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 4, 2010, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees 
of the Town of Islip (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All White Collar titles set forth in "Schedule A" annexed hereto. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on 
August 17, 2010, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the 
petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York 
A A/um^C^-
Jerome Lefkowitz//Chairmarf 
-Q/^2-
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKVILLE CENTRE VILLAGE EMPLOYEES CIVIL 
SERVICE ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28846 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF ROCKVILLE CENTRE, 
Respondent. 
LAW OFFICES OF WAYNE J. SCHAEFER, LLC (WAYNE J. SCHAEFER) for 
Charging Party 
CULLEN AND DYKMAN LLP (GERARD FISHBERG of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Incorporated Village of 
Rockville Center (Village) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Rockville Centre Village Employees Civil Service 
Association, Inc. (Association) alleging that the Village violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred the duties of 
parking meter coin collection to a nonunit employee. The ALJ concluded that the 
Village's unilateral transfer of those duties violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act.1 
1
 42 PERB TJ4571 (2009) 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Village challenges both the ALJ's conclusion that it violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act, and the proposed remedial order. The Village contends that the 
ALJ erred in concluding that it violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act on the grounds that: its 
unilateral action constitutes a managerial prerogative involving a decrease in the 
number of hours worked; the reassigned duties were not substantially similar to the 
work previously performed by unit employees; and the Association never demanded 
negotiations. Finally, the Village claims that the ALJ's proposed remedial order 
interferes with its managerial prerogatives and violates public policy. The Association 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision but modify his remedial order, in part. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision, and are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
For at least seventeen years, the duties of parking meter coin collection and 
minor meter repairs have been performed exclusively by Association unit employees. 
Approximately six years ago, the Village installed electronic and municipal meters 
resulting in an 18%-20% decline in coin collection work, and an even greater decrease 
in the amount of minor repairs performed by unit employees. 
For sixteen years, Noel Johnson (Johnson) was the unit employee who primarily 
performed the work. For a number of those years, he frequently worked part-time, 
performing his duties in the morning and taking vacation leave in the afternoons. On 
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days when he was absent, two other unit employees performed the work, each 
completing their respective tasks within two hours. Following Johnson's death in the 
autumn of 2007, other unit employees continued to exclusively perform the work. In 
November 2008, the Village hired a nonunit part-time employee to work four hours a 
day, and the at-issue work was reassigned to him. 
DISCUSSION 
A unilateral transfer of exclusively performed bargaining unit work to nonunit 
employees violates §209-a.1(d) of the Act unless the work reassigned is not 
substantially similar to the exclusively performed unit work.2 However, when there has 
been a significant change in job qualifications or there has been a curtailment in the 
level of services, we will balance the respective interests of the public employer and the 
unit employees, both individually and collectively, to determine whether there has been 
a violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act.3 
Contrary to the Village's argument, the unilateral action in this case does not 
involve a reduction in the work hours of unit employees resulting from a diminution in the 
amount of work to be performed4 Rather, the charge alleges, and the evidence 
demonstrates, that the Village unilaterally transferred unit work without a related 
2
 See, Niagara Frontier Transp Auth, 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985); Town of West Seneca, 19 
PERB 1J3028 (1986); Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 1J3005 (2008), 
confirmed and mod, in part, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittiur, 42 PERB 
H3016 (2009); County of Westchester, 42 PERB 1J3025 (2009). 
3
 Supra note 2. 
4
 Lackawanna Cent Sch Dist, 12 PERB 1J3122 (1979). See also, Vestal Cent Sch Dist, 
15 PERB fl3006 (1982), confirmed sub nom. Vestal Teachers Assn v Newman, 95 
AD2d 940, 16 PERB 1T7020 (1983); County of Erie, 43 PERB 1J3016 (2010). 
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curtailment in the level of services. The reduction in work cited by the Village began at 
least six years ago and led to unit employees performing the work on a part-time basis 
until the Village unilaterally transferred the work to a nonunit part-time employee in 2008. 
The Village's related argument that the reassigned work is not substantially similar to the 
work exclusively performed by unit employees is equally without merit. The changes 
resulting from the installation of electronic and municipal meters took place six years 
before the unilateral transfer. There is no evidence of any change in the nature of the 
work at the time of the transfer, if ever; the duties were performed by unit employees on a 
part-time basis, well before the transfer of the unit work. Therefore, the Village's unilateral 
action constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiations. Furthermore, the Association was 
not obligated to request negotiations.5 
PERB has broad remedial make-whole powers, pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, 
to order a party to cease and desist from engaging in an improper practice, and to order 
such affirmative action that will effectuate the policies of the Act including ordering the 
reinstatement of employees with or without back wages.6 
While an employer has the prerogative under the Act to.determine the manner 
and means by which services are provided, a unilateral decision to subcontract those 
services is a mandatory subject of negotiations that can be remedied pursuant to 
§205.5(d) of the Act. The ALJ's proposed order requiring inter alia, restoration of the 
work of parking meter coin collection to Association unit employees, and to make unit 
employees whole for wages and benefits that may have been lost as a result of the 
5
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 39 PERB P014 (2006); 
Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 19 PERB 1J3037 (1986). 
6
 County of Erie, supra note 4. 
Case No. U-28846 -5-
unilateral transfer, is fully consistent with our precedent, and it does not constitute a 
violation of public policy.7 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's decision finding that the Village 
violated §209- a. 1(d) of the Act but modify, in part, the recommended remedial order.8 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Village shall: 
1. Not unilaterally transfer to nonunit employees the work of parking meter coin 
collection; 
2. Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost as a result of 
the unilateral transfer of the work of parking meter coin collection to a nonunit employee 
plus interest at the maximum legal rate; 
3. Restore to unit employees the bargaining unit work of parking meter coin 
collection; 
4. Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations normally used for communications with employees in the unit. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York A 
Jerome Lefk^witz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
7
 See, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, supra note 2; FIT, 41 PERB U 3010 (2008), 
confirmed, FIT v New York State Pub Empl Re Bd, 68 AD3d 605, 42 PERB H7011 (1st 
Dept2009). 
8
 We have modified the posting requirement to,be consistent with our recent precedent. 
See, County of Monroe, 43 PERB 1J3025 (2010); Town ofWallkill, 43 PERB P026 
(2010). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Village of Rockville Centre in the bargaining unit 
represented by Rockville Centre Village Employees Civil Service Association, Inc. that 
the Village of Rockville Centre will: 
1. Not transfer to nonunit employees the work of parking meter coin collection; 
2. Make Association unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost as a 
result of its unilateral transfer to nonunit employees of the parking meter coin 
collection work with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
3. Restore to unit employees the bargaining unit Work of parking meter coin 
collection. 
Dated By 
on behalf of Village of Rockville Centre 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other m 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28160 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
SHEEHAN, GREENE, CARRAWAY, GOLDERMAN & JACQUES, LLP 
(WILLIAM P. GOLDERMAN of counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (GARY SIMPSON of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the State of New York 
(Department of Gorrectional Services) (State) to a decision by the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director), on an improper 
practice charge filed by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) concluding that the State violated §§209-a.1(a) and (g) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it denied NYSCOPBA 
representation of a probationary correction officer during questioning by a Department 
of Correctional Services (DOCS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigator on 
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January 28, 2008 about the attempted suicide of an inmate under the correction officer's 
immediate supervision at the Great Meadow Correctional Facility.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the State advances a number of legal arguments to support its 
contention that the NYSCOPBA-represented probationary employee was not entitled to 
representation under §209-a. 1(g) of the Act including: a) probationary employees are not 
covered by §209-a.1(g) of the Act because they cannot be the subject of potential 
disciplinary action; b) the purpose of §209-a.1 (g) of the Act was to grant representational 
rights only to those employees who are subject to Civ Serv Law §75 disciplinary 
procedures or who are subject to disciplinary procedures under a collectively negotiated 
agreement; c) federal precedent is irrelevant to a proper interpretation of the rights 
granted by §209-a.1(g) of the Act; and d) an interpretation of §209-a.1(g) of the Act that 
recognizes representational rights to probationary employees is an impairment of the 
State's contractual rights in violation of Article 1, §10 of the United States Constitution. 
In addition, the State contends that the Assistant Director erred in concluding that 
it violated §§209-a.1(a) and (g) of the Act on the grounds that: a) the correction officer 
did not explicitly request representation on January 28, 2008; b) at the time of the 
questioning, it did not reasonably appear that the correction officer was a potential 
subject or target of disciplinary action; c) the questioning of the correction officer by 
DOCS OIG does not establish that he was a potential subject of discipline; d) the 
Assistant Director improperly placed the burden of proof on the State to demonstrate 
142 PERB H4552 (2009). 
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that the correction officer was not the subject of potential disciplinary action at the time 
of questioning; and e) the denial of representation during employer questioning of a 
public employee does not constitute a violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act. Finally, the 
State excepts to the Assistant Director's proposed remedial order. 
Based upon our review of the record, and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision and order, in part, but reverse her 
finding that the State violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act, and modify the proposed remedial 
order. 
FACTS 
Article 8 of the collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) between the State 
and NYSCOPBA includes a negotiated disciplinary procedure in lieu of the procedures 
and remedies contained in Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76. Section 8.1 of the agreement 
states: 
Discipline shall be imposed upon employees otherwise 
subject to the provisions of Section 75 and 76 of the Civil 
Service Law only pursuant to this Article, and the procedure 
and remedies herein provided shall apply in lieu of the 
procedure and remedies prescribed by such sections of the 
Civil Service Law which shall not apply to employees.2 
The agreement's Bill of Rights expressly grants unit members the right to NYSCOPBA 
representation during an interrogation if it is contemplated that the employee will be 
served with a notice of discipline pursuant to Article 8. In addition, the Bill of Rights 
prohibits the State's use of a statement or admission made by a unit employee during 
2
 Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 25-26. 
Case No. U-28160 - 4 -
an interrogation if an employee's contractual right to NYSCOPBA representation is 
denied.3 
Section 9.7 of the DOCS employee manual sets forth a specific protocol for 
employees to follow when responding to inmate suicides and attempted suicides: 
3
 In relevant part, the Bill of Rights states that: 
(C) No employee shall be requested to sign a statement of an 
admission of guilt to be used in a disciplinary proceeding 
under Article 8 without having Union representation. 
(G) An employee shall be entitled to Union representation at an 
interrogation if it is contemplated that such employee will be 
served a notice of discipline pursuant to Article 8 of this 
Agreement. Such employee shall not be required to sign 
any statement arising out of such interrogation. 
(H) Except as provided below, any statements or admissions 
made by an employee during such and interrogation without 
the opportunity to have Union representation may not be 
subsequently used in a disciplinary proceeding against that 
employee. 
(I) If representation is requested by the employee and if such 
representation is not provided by the Union within a 
reasonable period of time, the Employer may proceed with 
the interrogation. 
(K) Any employee who is subject to questioning by his/her 
Department's Inspector General's Office shall, whenever the 
nature of the investigation permits, be. notified at least 24 
hours prior to the interview. 
Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 6-7. 
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In cases of suicide or attempted suicide, the physician 
and supervising officer will be notified immediately. If an 
inmate is found hanging, he/she will be taken down 
immediately and first aid administered until medical arrives. 
In case of death, all precautions will be taken to preserve 
evidence of the manner of death.4 
Jason Chagnon (Chagnon) commenced employment as a DOCS correction officer 
in May 2007. On January 28, 2008, Chagnon had not completed the probationary period 
applicable to his position. On that date, he was assigned to the Great Meadow 
Correctional Facility and worked the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. shift in the Special Housing 
Unit. (SHU). SHU houses approximately 30 inmates, and Chagnon was the primary 
correction officer responsible for their direct care, custody and control. A second 
correction officer was assigned to the locked SHU console, but he was not permitted to 
leave the console unless all the gates were closed, and he was relieved by another officer. 
While making his rounds during the second hour of his shift, Chagnon observed 
an inmate in a cell with a sheet tied around his neck and attached to the cell bars, in an 
apparent suicide attempt. Without entering the cell, Chagnon made two unsuccessful 
attempts at getting a verbal response from the inmate by calling his name and kicking 
the cell. Thereafter, the console officer contacted medical staff. A short time later, a 
sergeant and another officer arrived at SHU, and they entered the inmate's cell with 
Chagnon. While in the cell, the sergeant ordered Chagnon to open a small sliding gate 
in the front of the cell to permit the cutting of the sheet attached to the inmate's neck. 
4
 The text of the DOCS employee manual provision is set forth in a DOCS counseling 
memorandum in the record. Joint Exhibit 5. 
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The inmate was then transferred to the facility hospital by security staff and died three 
days later.5 
At approximately 7:30 p.m. on January 28, 2008, Chagnon was relieved of his SHU 
duties, and directed to prepare a memorandum describing the events relating to the 
inmate's suicide attempt for the facility's superintendent. Later, Chagnon and other DOCS 
employees on duty at the time of the attempted suicide were placed in an office together, 
and they were directed not to discuss the incident until DOCS OIG investigators arrived to 
question them. 
DOCS OIG is responsible for investigating cases of possible employee misconduct 
or violations of law by staff and inmates. Although the Bill of Rights states that, in general, 
employees are to receive 24 hours notice before being questioned by DOCS OIG, it is 
undisputed that such notice was not provided in the present case because of the 
exigencies associated with an investigation into an attempted inmate suicide.6 
Following their arrival at the facility on the evening of January 28, 2008, DOCS 
OIG investigators separately questioned at least five NYSCOPBA represented 
employees, including Chagnon. With the exception of Chagnon, each correction officer, 
including a sergeant who had not completed his promotional probationary period, was 
permitted NYSCOPBA representation during the questioning.7 
5
 Joint Exhibits 2 and 3. 
6
 Transcript, pp. 104, 106, 120. 
7
 Transcript, pp. 97, 99-100, 123-124. 
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At approximately midnight, a DOCS OIG investigator met with Chagnon and his 
NYSCOPBA shop steward for the purpose of questioning Chagnon about the suicide 
attempt. Prior to the meeting, the DOCS OIG investigator had reviewed the 
memorandum that Chagnon had prepared for the facility superintendent, and was 
aware that Chagnon was the first employee to discover the inmate. 
At the commencement of questioning, Chagnon was asked to state his name and 
seniority date. After learning of Chagnon's seniority date, the investigator informed 
Chagnon that he was not entitled to continued NYSCOPBA representation during 
questioning because he was still on probation. In response, the shop steward stated 
that Chagon had a right to NYSCOPBA representation during the questioning based 
upon a newly enacted law. During his testimony, the investigator acknowledged that in 
response to the shop steward's question about whether Chagnon was going to be 
disciplined, the investigator stated: "I couldn't make that determination. It's not my 
decision."8 The investigator also admitted that the shop steward explicitly requested 
that Chagnon be permitted to have NYSCOPBA representation during the questioning.9 
The investigator asked Chagnon and the shop steward to leave the room to 
afford him the opportunity to telephone his supervisor with respect to the shop steward's 
reference to the newly enacted law.10 Following the investigator's unsuccessful efforts 
at reaching a supervisor, Chagnon and the shop steward returned and were informed 
8
 Transcript, pp. 114-115. 
9
 Transcript, pp. 113, 137. 
10
 At the time, the DOCS OIG investigator was unaware that §209-a. 1(g) of Act had 
been.enacted. Transcript, p. 115. 
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that Chagnon would be questioned without NYSCOPBA representation. As a result, the 
shop steward was not present during the questioning of Chagnon, which lasted 
approximately 30 minutes and focused on the content of his earlier memorandum about 
the suicide attempt. Chagnon testified that during the questioning, he again requested 
employee organization representation. In contrast, the investigator testified that the 
only request for representation was made by the shop steward.11 According to the 
investigator, NYSCOPBA representation was denied to Chagnon because he was on 
probation, and probationary employees are not subject to discipline. 
Pending completion of the DOCS OIG investigation, Chagnon was placed on 
administrative leave with pay for three weeks, effective February 15, 2008. Under the 
terms of the leave, Chagnon was prohibited from leaving his home during normal work 
hours. Following issuance of the DOCS OIG investigatory report, he returned to work. 
On March 22, 2008, he was formally counseled for violating §9.7 of the DOCS 
employee manual based upon his delays after discovering the suicide attempt.12 
Specifically, Chagnon was counseled for failing to immediately cut the ligature used by 
the inmate, remove the inmate from the cell, and provide the inmate with first aid aimed 
at saving his life. 
11
 Transcript, pp. 24, 113. 
12
 Joint Exhibit 5. In addition, the counseling memorandum referenced a 2007 
memorandum from the DOCS Deputy Commissioner for Correctional Facilities that 
stated, in part: "Therefore, prompt action can mean the difference between life and 
death. If the first individuals who respond to the scene of a health care emergency, 
such as an inmate hanging, are security staff, they can not await the arrival of medical 
staff before CPR and other first aid measures are started." 
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DISCUSSION 
This case presents the Board with its first opportunity to examine the breadth of 
the representation rights, and the employer's affirmative defense, afforded under §209-
a.1(g) of the Act.13 Therefore, prior to examining the State's specific exceptions from 
the Assistant Director's decision, it is appropriate to review the background, text and 
legislative history of §209-a.1(g) of the Act. 
A. Background, Text and Legislative History of §209-a.1(q) of the Act 
In New York City Transit Authority v New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board u (hereinafter NYCTA), the Court of Appeals reversed a Board 
decision15 finding a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act when an employer 
denied an employee's request for employee organization representation during an 
investigatory interview that may have reasonably led to disciplinary action. In reversing 
the Board, the Court of Appeals held that §202 of the Act did not grant public employees 
an inherent statutory right to representation similar to the right that was recognized in 
NLRB v J Weingarten, /A7C16 (hereinafter Weingarten) for private sector employees 
under §7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).17 J 
13
 L 2007, c. 244. 
14
 8 NY3d 226, 40 PERB 1(7001 (2007). 
15
 35 PERB 1J3029 (2002). 
16
 420 US 251 (1975). 
17
 29 USC §157. 
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In construing §202 of the Act, the NYCTA Court compared it with two other 
statutes: §7 of the NLRA and Civ Serv Law §75. It reasoned that, unlike §7 of the 
NLRA, §202 of the Act does not grant public employees the right to "engage in 
concerted activities for. . . mutual aid or protection," a right relied upon by the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Weingarten when it determined that private sector 
employees had the right to representation during employer questioning. In addition, the 
NYCTA Court cited the statutory language and related legislative history of the 1993 
amendment to Civ Serv Law §75.2, which granted an explicit right to representation 
during employer questioning of an employee who is subject to Civ Serv Law §75 
disciplinary procedures.18 It concluded that the Legislature's inclusion of an explicit 
Civ Serv Law §75.2 states, in relevant part, that: 
An employee who at the time of questioning appears to be a potential 
subject of disciplinary action shall have a right to representation by his or 
her certified or recognized employee organization under article fourteen of 
this chapter and shall be notified in advance, in writing, of such right. A 
state employee who is designated managerial or confidential under article 
fourteen of this chapter, shall, at the time of questioning, where it appears 
that such employee is a potential subject of disciplinary action, have a 
right to representation and shall be notified in advance, in writing, of such 
right. If representation is requested a reasonable period of time shall be 
afforded to obtain such representation. If the employee is unable to obtain 
representation within a reasonable period of time the employer has the 
right to then question the employee. A hearing officer under this section 
shall have the power to find that a reasonable period of time was or was 
not afforded. In the event the hearing officer finds that a reasonable period 
of time was not afforded then any and all statements obtained from said 
questioning as well as any evidence or information obtained as a result of 
said questioning shall be excluded, provided, however, that this 
subdivision shall not modify or replace any written collective agreement 
between a public employer and employee organization negotiated 
pursuant to article fourteen of this chapter. 
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statutory right to such representation in Civ Serv Law §75.2 demonstrated that §202 of 
the Act did not grant an implicit representational right. 
In direct response to the NYCTA decision, the Legislature amended the Act in 
2007 by adding §209-a.1(g) to create a new improper employer practice, and a related 
affirmative defense to such a charge. In amending the Act, however, the Legislature did 
not amend §§202 or 203 to reference a right to employee organization representation 
during employer questioning when it reasonably appears that the employee may be a 
potential subject of discipline. 
Section 209-a.1(g) of the Act states that it is an improper employer practice 
to fail to permit or refuse to afford a public employee the 
right, upon the employee's demand, to representation by a 
representative of the employee organization, or the designee 
of such organization, which has been certified or recognized 
under this article when at the time of questioning by the 
employer of such employee it reasonably appears that he or 
she may be the subject of a potential disciplinary action. If 
representation is requested, and the employee is a potential 
target of disciplinary action at the time of questioning, a 
reasonable period of time shall be afforded to the employee 
to obtain such representation. 
In order to demonstrate a violation of §209-a.1(g) of the Act, a charging party 
must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that: a demand for representation was 
made by a public employee; the employer failed to permit or refused to afford the 
employee organizational representation during questioning by the employer; and at the 
time of the employer's questioning, it reasonably appeared that the employee may have 
been the subject or target of potential disciplinary action. 
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In drafting §209-a.1(g) of the Act, the Legislature did not distinguish between an 
employer questioning an employee during an interrogation, interview, meeting or any 
other particular setting. Furthermore, it placed a relatively low threshold for an 
entitlement to representation by conditioning it upon a request for representation and a 
reasonable appearance that the employee may be the subject or target of potential 
discipline. 
The legislative history of the provision supports the conclusion that, as remedial 
legislation aimed at overturning the result in NYCTA, §209-a.1(g) of the Act "is entitled 
to a liberal construction with respect to the representational rights protected."19 In his 
memorandum in support of the bill, Assembly member Peter J. Abbate, Jr., the primary 
Assembly sponsor, stated that the purpose of the legislation was to overturn NYCTA by 
extending to public employees the representational rights of private sector employees 
as interpreted in Weingarten, and thereby eliminating any "uncertainty and 
disagreement over the question to the benefit of public employees, unions and public 
employers alike who will be freed from exposure to potentially costly and disruptive 
litigation."20 
Governor Spitzer expressed a similar rationale in his approval statement of the 
legislation: 
In approving this bill, and in finding that allowing such 
representation is a good practice both for finding the truth 
and for protecting employee's rights, I am following the 
19
 Tarrytown PBA, 40 PERB H3024 at 3104 (2007); State of New York (DOCS) (Biegel), 
42 PERB U3013 (2009); McKinney's Statutes §321. 
20
 L 2007, c. 244, Bill Jacket, p. 8. 
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position previously adopted by the Public Employment 
Relations Board ("PERB") and the United States Supreme 
Court, as well as the practice adhered to by most public 
employers, and currently set forth in the Civil Service Law.21 
Unlike other improper practices defined in §§209-a.1 and 2 of the Act, however, 
the Legislature codified an affirmative defense to a charge alleging a violation of §209-
a.1(g) of the Act, which states: 
It shall be an affirmative defense to any improper practice 
charge under paragraph (g) of this subdivision that the 
employee has the right, pursuant to statute, interest 
arbitration award, collectively negotiated agreement, policy 
or practice, to present to a hearing officer or arbitrator 
evidence of the employer's failure to provide representation 
and to obtain exclusion of the resulting evidence upon 
demonstration of such failure. 
In his approval statement, Governor Spitzer explained the genesis and purpose of this 
affirmative defense: 
[C]ontrary to the assertions of some of the bill's opponents, 
this bill does not give an employee "two bites at the apple" -
i.e., allow the employee to argue for exclusion of evidence 
based on the violation of a right to representation in an 
internal disciplinary proceeding, and then again before the 
PERB. Indeed, the bill was amended at my insistence to 
eliminate that problem, by making it a defense to an 
improper practice charge before PERB when the employer 
has a policy or practice of allowing an employee to 
demonstrate a violation of this right before an arbitrator or 
hearing officer. Thus, so long as an employee is provided 
with the chance to prove that this right was violated, and to 
exclude evidence if it has been, there can be no improper 
practice charge22 (emphasis added) 
Governor Spitzer's Approval Memorandum No. 10, supra note 21 at p. 3. 
Supra note 21. 
Case No. U-28160 - 1 4 -
Govemor Sptizer's approval statement supports the conclusion that the affirmative 
defense was the result of a legislative compromise, and was crafted to ensure that an 
employee covered by the Act would have only a single forum in which to obtain relief for 
an alleged violation of a right to employee organization representation during employer 
questioning. 
Under the affirmative defense, a respondent can defeat a charge alleging a 
violation of §209-a. 1 (g) of the Act by pleading and proving that the at-issue employee 
had a right to: a) employee organization representation during such questioning under a 
separate "statute, interest arbitration award, collectively negotiated agreement, policy or 
practice; and b) seek a ruling from a hearing officer or arbitrator to exclude evidence 
stemming from the employer's failure to permit employee organizational representation 
during the questioning. 
Finally, §209-a.1(g) of the Act expressly excludes the right to employee 
organization representation "in any criminal investigation."23 
We next examine the State's exceptions to the Assistant's Director's decision 
finding that an employer can violate §209-a.1(g) of the Act by denying employee 
organizational representation during questioning of a probationary employee. 
B. Exceptions Challenging the Applicability of 5209-a.1(q) to Probationary 
Employees 
In drafting §209-a.1(g) of the Act, the Legislature granted representational rights 
to a "public employee," a phrase defined in §201.7(a) of the Act as "any person holding 
23
 See also, City of Rochester, 37 PERB 1J3015 (2004), reversed, City of Rochester v 
Pub Empl Rel Bd, 15 AD3d 922, 38 PERB 1J7003 (4th Dept 2005) Iv denied, 4 NY3d 
710, 38 PERB 117008 (2005). 
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a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer...." While 
§201.7(a) of the Act excludes various positions from that definition, those exclusions are 
not premised upon an individual's civil service jurisdictional classification, form of civil 
service appointment, the degree of tenure protections, or whether a competitive class 
employee has satisfied the applicable probationary period.24 
Based upon the definition of the phrase "public employee" in the Act, we 
conclude that §209-a. 1(g) of the Act was intended to grant representational rights and 
the improper practice procedure to all public employees covered under the Act including 
those holding probationary, provisional and temporary appointments under the Civil 
Service Law,25 subject to the affirmative defense that the employee has equivalent 
protections from a legal source external to the Act. Our conclusion is fully consistent 
with the purpose of §209-a.1(g) of the Act, as established by its text and legislative 
history. 
In contrast, the rights to representation under Civ Serv Law §75.2 are limited to those 
classes of employees identified in Civ Serv Law §§75.1(a)-(e). 
25
 Civ Serv Law §§63, 64 and 65. Contrary to the State's assertion the legislative history 
does mention probationary employees. Memorandum on Behalf of the State of New 
York, p. 38. In its memorandum in opposition to the legislation, the Governor's Office of 
Employee Relations stated: 
The bill does not differentiate between types of public employees. 
Probationary employees do not have tenure rights, thus rights to a 
disciplinary hearing if they fail probation and are thus terminated. 
However, as this bill is silent on the subject, this would be the first 
intrusion by unions into the probationary status of employees. 
L 2007, c. 244, Bill Jacket, supra note 20 at p.28. 
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, Prior to the enactment of §209-a. 1 (g) of the Act, it was well-settled that 
probationary employees can be subjected to discipline for misconduct or incompetence. 
In County of Wyoming,26 the Board ordered the reinstatement of a probationary 
employee who had been terminated for purported misconduct, which the Board 
concluded was pretextual under the Act. In reaching our decision, we stated: 
The termination of a probationary employee's public 
employment must, therefore, implicate the protections 
afforded by the Act to trigger PERB's jurisdiction. It is in this 
area of discipline and/or termination of probationary 
employment that questions about the Act's coverage have 
arisen.27 
Similarly, the courts have repeatedly recognized that probationary employees 
can be terminated for engaging in misconduct during the probationary period.28 
Therefore, we are not persuaded by the State's argument that the representational 
rights granted by §209-a.1(g) of the Act are inapplicable to probationary employees 
because they are not subject to Civ Serv Law §75 disciplinary procedures. While §209-
26
 34 PERB 1J3042(2001). 
27
 Supra note 26 PERB P042 at 3101. See also, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Waldmiller), 27 PERB P040 (1994) (employee organization did not breach its duty of 
fair representation by failing to challenge the termination of a probationary correction 
officer for misconduct). 
28
 Garcia vBratton, 90 NY2d 991 (1997) (affirming the termination of a probationary 
police officer, without a hearing, for misconduct at a homicide scene); Vetter v Board of 
Education, 14 NY3d 729 (2010) (upholding termination of a probationary school teacher 
based upon allegations of misconduct by his employer; Matter of Campbell (State of 
New York), 37 AD3d 993 (3d Dept 2007) (affirming the termination of a State employee 
for misconduct who had been returned to probationary status pursuant to a prior 
disciplinary settlement). See also, Dillon v Safir, 270 AD2d 116 (1st Dept 2000) 
(probationary police officer terminated for use of excessive force; Cade v Health and 
Hospitals Corp, 15 AD3d 179 (1st Dept 2005) (provisional employee subjected to 
termination for misconduct). 
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a.2(g) of the Act utilizes the phrase "the subject of a potential disciplinary action," we do 
not interpret the use of that phrase as demonstrating a legislative intent to limit the 
provision's coverage to only those employees who are subject to "disciplinary action" 
under Civ Serv Law §75. The adoption of the State's argument would render §209-a. 1(g) 
of the Act superfluous, and would nullify the Legislature's effort to ensure Weingarten-
type rights for all public employees under the Act. 
There are notable differences between §209-a.1(g) of the Act and Civ Serv Law 
§75.2 that support our conclusion that the Legislature intended the scope of the right to 
representation to be broader under the Act. The denial of representation constitutes an 
improper practice under §209-a.1(g) of the Act when it "reasonably appears" that an 
employee is either the "target" or the "subject" of potential disciplinary action. However, 
the right to representation attaches under Civ Serv Law §75.2 only when it "appears" 
that the employee is the "subject" of potential disciplinary action.29 
Furthermore, the State's statutory construction argument aimed at excluding 
probationary employees from coverage under §209-a.1(g) of the Act is contradicted by 
4 NYCRR §4.5Q), a subdivision of the State Civil Service regulations for probationary 
employees, which states: 
Removal during probationary term: 
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to limit 
or otherwise affect the authority of an appointing authority, 
at anytime during the probationary term, to remove a 
probationer for incompetency or misconduct, under section 
29
 At the same time, §209-a.1(g) of the Act does not require an employer to provide the 
employee with advance written notice of his or her right to representation as is required 
under Civ Serv Law §75.2. 
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75 of the Civil Sen/ice Law or an agreement negotiated 
between the State and an employee organization pursuant 
to article 14 of such law. (emphasis added). 
Under this regulation, a probationary employee can be terminated for misconduct 
or incompetence, prior to the expiration of the minimum period of probation, through Civ 
Serv Law §75 disciplinary procedures or procedures under a negotiated agreement.30 
In contrast, a probationary employee can be terminated without the employer following 
those disciplinary procedures at any time between the minimum and maximum periods 
of probation.31 
In its answer, the State did not plead as an affirmative defense that the regulation 
provided Chagnon with a source of right external to the Act; therefore the defense is 
waived.32 Additionally, the record does not support the conclusion that, at the time of 
the questioning on January 28, 2008, Chagnon was still in his minimum period of 
probation. As a result, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the civil service 
regulation can form the basis for an affirmative defense under §209-a.1(g) of the Act.33 
30
 See, Tuller v Cent Sch Dist No. 1 of the Towns of Conklin, 40 NY2d 487, 492 (1976); 
New York State Department of Civil Service State Personnel Management Manual, 
2010 Probation, §221. 
31
 4 NYCRR §4.5(a). 
32
 ALJ Exhibit 2; City of Oswego, 41 PERB 1J3011 (2008). 
33
 In addition, we do not have to determine whether, prior to questioning a probationary 
employee during the minimum period of probation, an employer is required to provide 
the probationary employee with the written notice of the right to representation set forth 
in Civ Serv Law §75.2. 
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In its exceptions, the State also challenges the Assistant Director's reliance upon 
federal private sector precedent. Consistent with §209-a.6 of the Act, however, private 
sector case law is a permissible reservoir of persuasive, but not binding, authority in 
determining improper practice charges. Federal precedent can be valuable when 
interpreting and applying §209-a.1(g) of the Act because the Legislature intended to 
extend to all public employees under the Act representational rights similar to those 
found under Weingarten. However, in reaching our decision today, we have not relied 
upon such precedent. 
Finally, we examine the State's contention that recognition of representational 
rights for probationary employees under §209-a.1(g) of the Act constitutes an 
impairment of its contractual rights in violation of Article 1, §10 of the United States 
Constitution.34 The State's constitutional argument is premised upon the undisputed 
fact that probationary employees in the NYSCOPBA unit are not covered by Article 8 of 
the parties' agreement, and therefore, they are not entitled to the related contractual 
right of NYSCOPBA representation during an interrogation. Based on the agreement's 
silence with respect to organizational representation of probationary employees during 
employer questioning, we find no merit to the State's argument that the application of 
§209-a.1(g) of the Act to probationary employees substantially impairs any right granted 
it by the parties' agreement. Indeed, Article 1, §10 does not constitute a constitutional 
34
 See, Buffalo Teachers Federation v Tobe, 464 F.3d 362 (2d Cir 2006), cert den, 550 
US 918 (2007); Condell v Bress, 983 F.2d 415 (2d Cir 1993); Association of Surrogates 
and Supreme Court Reporters Within City of New York v State of New York, 940 F2d 
766 (2d Cir 1991). 
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limitation on the power of the Legislature to expand the rights of employees such as 
ensuring that all employees covered by the Act are entitled to employee organizational 
representation during employer questioning. 
C. Exceptions Challenging the Finding that §209-a. 1 (q) of the Act was 
Violated by Denying Representation to Chaqnon 
Pursuant to §209-a. 1 (g) of the Act, the right to employee organizational 
representation during questioning by an employer is triggered by a request for such 
representation by the employee. 
Chagnon appeared for questioning by the DOCS OIG investigator along with a 
NYSCOPBA shop steward, who provided Chagnon representation during the preliminary 
questioning. The shop steward left the questioning only after unsuccessfully asserting to 
the investigator that Chagnon was entitled to continued representation. There is no 
evidence in the record that Chagnon objected to the shop steward's representation or 
objected to continued representation. 
Although Chagnon did not explicitly request NYSCOPBA representation at the 
outset of the questioning, while the shop steward was present, his conduct demonstrates 
that he requested representation both before and during the questioning. He appeared 
at the questioning with his shop steward, he permitted the shop steward to represent him 
during the initial questioning, and he consented to the shop steward's continued 
advocacy in support of his representation.35 
35
 Therefore, we need not remand the case for the resolution of the conflicting testimony 
as to whether Chagnon explicitly requested NYSCOPBA representation after the 
questioning recommenced without the presence of his shop steward. 
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Next, we turn to the State's exception challenging the Assistant Director's finding 
that, at the time of questioning by the DOCS OIG, it reasonably appeared that Chagnon 
was a potential subject or target of disciplinary action. 
In determining this question, we consider the totality of the circumstances 
including the reasonableness of the employee's subjective perception, which may have 
precipitated the request for representation. Although an employee's perceptions are 
relevant to our inquiry, our primary focus is on objective facts in the record. Those facts 
include: the subject matter and context of the questioning; the verbal and written 
statements by the employer prior to the questioning; the verbal exchange between the 
employer representative and the employee; the timing and venue of the questioning; 
and the treatment of other employees similarly situated. This list is not intended to be 
exhaustive, but it underscores the importance of clarity in communications, and in 
purpose, by an employer at the outset and during the questioning of an employee. 
It must be emphasized, however, that employee organization representation 
under §209-a.1(g) of the Act will not attach, in most situations, to verbal interactions 
with an employee during a meeting or discussion that is limited to counseling, training, 
evaluations, and updates on job assignments. For example, the right to representation 
will not ordinarily attach to a supervisory meeting with a probationary employee to 
discuss his or her status and progress.36 However, when a meeting or a discussion 
metamorphosizes into questioning about an employee's conduct or omissions in a 
See, 4 NYCRR §4.5(b)(5)(iii). 
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context that makes it reasonably appear that the employee may be a potential subject 
or target of discipline, representation rights of §209-a.1(g) of the Act can attach. 
In the present case, the record contains overwhelming objective evidence that at 
the time that Chagnon was questioned it reasonably appeared that he was a potential 
subject or target of discipline. The focus of the DOCS OIG investigation related to an 
attempted suicide by an inmate under Chagnon's direct care and control, an event of 
major significance and ramifications for the correctional institution and the inmate. 
Indeed, the DOCS employee manual contains a directive mandating a particular 
response to such incidents: the immediate extrication of an inmate found hanging, along 
with the immediate provision of first aid. 
The DOCS OIG investigator arrived at the facility within hours of the incident to 
commence the investigation.37 Prior to questioning Chagnon, the investigator had read 
Chagnon's earlier memorandum to the superintendent, which indicated that Chagnon 
delayed entering the cell, cutting the sheet attached to the inmate's neck, and providing 
the inmate with first aid. On its face, Chagnoh's memorandum suggests that his actions 
in response to the suicide attempt may have violated the mandates of the DOCS 
employee manual, which would render him a potential subject or target of discipline. In 
addition, the fact that the investigator permitted NYSCOPBA representation at the 
outset of the questioning of Chagnon demonstrates that the investigator viewed 
Chagnon as a potential subject of discipline. Furthermore, during the meeting with 
37
 The State does not argue that the DOCS OIG investigator was conducting a criminal 
investigation when he questioned Chagnon, and there is no evidence in the record to 
support such an argument. As noted, employee organizational representation under 
§209-a.1(g) of the Act does not apply to a criminal investigation. 
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Chagnon and the shop steward, the investigator reinforced the potential for discipline by 
stating that he was not the person who would be determining whether to proceed with 
disciplinary action. 
Contrary to the State's contention, the fact that other NYSCOPBA employees 
were permitted representation during questioning that night is relevant to determining 
whether Chagnon was also a potential subject or target of discipline. Those other 
employees had a contractual right to be represented during an interrogation only when 
DOCS contemplated serving a notice of discipline under the parties' agreement. There 
is no evidence in the record to find that Chagnon was less vulnerable to potential 
disciplinary culpability than the other employees questioned regarding the response to 
the suicide attempt. 
Finally, we reject the State's claim that the Assistant Director misapplied the 
applicable burden of proof. The charging party has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of evidence the elements necessary to demonstrate a violation of §209-
a.1(g) of the Act. The fact that the Assistant Director was not persuaded by the State's 
evidence aimed at demonstrating that Chagnon was not a potential subject of discipline 
does not constitute a misapplication of the burden of proof. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Assistant Director's conclusion that the 
State violated §209-a.1 (g) of the Act by denying NYSCOPBA representation to 
Chagnon during questioning on January 28, 2008. 
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D. Exception Challenging the Finding that §209-a.1(a) of the Act was Violated 
When the Legislature enacted §209-a.1(g) of the Act, it chose not to amend §202 
of the Act despite the NYCTA Court's conclusion that §202 did not grant public 
employees an inherent right to representation during investigatory questioning by an 
employer, resulting in the reversal of our decision finding a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and 
(c) of the Act. 
Based upon NYCTA, and the Legislature's failure to amend §202 of the Act, we 
conclude that the mere denial of employee organizational representation during 
questioning does not constitute a violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act. As a result, we 
reverse the Assistant Director's finding that the State violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act 
when it denied such representation to Chagnon. 
E. Exception Challenging the Proposed Remedial Order 
In its exceptions, the State challenges the Assistant Director's proposed remedial 
order asserting that it is inappropriate based upon the law and facts in the present case. 
In particular, it objects to that portion of the proposed remedial order directing the 
immediate removal and destruction of all documents in its possession relating to that 
portion of the January 28, 2008 questioning of Chagnon when he was denied 
NYSCOPBA representation. 
Pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, PERB is granted broad remedial make-whole 
authority to order a party to cease and desist from engaging in an improper practice, 
and to order such affirmative action that will effectuate the policies of the Act, including 
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ordering the reinstatement of employees with or without back wages.38 
In the present case, the evidence reveals that Chagnon was denied NYSCOBPA 
representation based upon an employer policy of denying such representation to 
probationary employees even when, at the time of questioning, it reasonably appears 
that the employee may be the subject of discipline, and despite the enactment of §209-
a.1(g) of the Act. Therefore, we affirm the breadth of the Assistant Director's proposed 
remedial order mandating the State to permit, upon the employee's demand, 
representation of a DOCS probationary employee in the NYSCOPBA represented unit 
when at the time of questioning it reasonably appears that he or she may be the subject 
of potential disciplinary action. We, however, have modified the wording of the remedial 
order to track the provisions of §209-a.1 (g) of the Act. 
In County of Monroe,39 we applied our authority to remedy improper practices by 
ordering an employer to, inter alia, destroy the results of a poll conducted of unit 
members, and to take all steps reasonably necessary to ensure such destruction. The 
Assistant Director, in the second numbered paragraph of her proposed remedial order, 
has recommended a similar remedy of mandating the State to remove and destroy 
documents that were prepared utilizing information obtained during that portion of the 
January 28, 2008 questioning when Chagnon was unrepresented. Following our 
review, we affirm that portion of the proposed remedial order but modify it to require the 
State to remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State, including 
38
 County of Erie, 43 PERB H3016 (2010). 
39
 43 PERB H3025(2010). 
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documents in Chagnon's personnel history file and the DOC OIG's investigatory notes, 
memoranda, email, and reports, which may contain information obtained from Chagnon 
during the January 28, 2008 questioning while unrepresented. 
Next, we examine that portion of the Assistant Director's proposed order 
requiring the State to reconsider its March 22, 2008 counseling, and the subsequent 
"suspension" with pay of Chagnon. The record reveals that Chagnon was not 
suspended, but rather was placed on an administrative leave with pay pending 
completion of the State's investigation. His placement on administrative leave may have 
resulted in the extension of his probationary period pursuant to 4 NYCRR §4.5(f), 
thereby delaying the date of his permanent appointment. Therefore, we have amended 
the Assistant Director's proposed order accordingly. Finally, we affirm the remainder of 
the Assistant Director's proposed remedial order but modify the posting requirement 
consistent with our recent precedent.40 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision finding that 
the State violated §209-a.1(g) of the Act, reverse the finding that it violated §209-a.1(a) 
of the Act, and modify the recommended remedial order. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State: 
1. permit, upon the employee's demand, representation for a DOCS probationary 
employee in the NYSCOPBA represented unit when at the time of questioning 
it reasonably appears that he or she may be the subject or target of potential 
disciplinary action; 
; County of Monroe, supra note 39; Town of Wallkill, 43 PERB TJ3026 (2010). 
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2. immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State, 
including documents in DOCS personnel records, correction officer Jason 
Chagnon's personnel history folder, and in DOCS OIG's investigatory notes, 
memoranda, email, and reports, which may contain information that was 
obtained during the January 28, 2008 questioning of Chagnon without 
representation; 
3. reconsider the March 22, 2008 counseling of correction officer Jason Chagnon 
without regard to the information obtained during the January 28, 2008 
questioning of Chagnon without representation; 
4. reconsider the placement of correction officer Jason Chagnon on 
administrative leave with pay without regard to the information obtained during 
the January 28, 2008 questioning without representation, and, if appropriate, 
modify his date of permanent appointment; 
5. sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkdwitz, Chairperson 
=2*r/ ^e~ 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
in the unit represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) that the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
will: 
1. permit, upon the employee's demand, representation for a DOCS probationary 
employee in the NYSCOPBA represented unit when at the time of questioning it 
reasonably appears that he or she may be the subject or target of potential 
disciplinary action; 
2. immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State, including 
documents in DOCS personnel records, correction officer Jason Chagnon's personnel 
history folder, and in DOC OIG's investigatory notes, memoranda, email, and reports, 
which may contain information that was obtained during the January 28, 2008 
questioning of Chagnon without representation; 
3. reconsider the March 22, 2008 counseling of correction officer Jason Chagnon without 
regard to the information obtained during the January 28, 2008 questioning of 
Chagnon without representation; 
4. reconsider the placement of correction officer Jason Chagnon on administrative leave 
with pay without regard to the information obtained during the January 28, 2008 
questioning without representation, and, if appropriate, modify his date of permanent 
appointment. 
Dated By 
on behalf of 
State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not 
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
MOUNT KISCO, NEW YORK, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27706 
- and -
VILLAGE OF MOUNT KISCO, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (TERRY O'NEIL and CHRISTOPHER 
KURTZ of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Police Benevolent 
Association of Mount Kisco, New York, Inc., (PBA) to a decision by the Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing a charge alleging that the Village of Mount Kisco (Village) 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally terminated a practice of paying PBA unit members their full salaries, without 
charging their leave accruals, when they were absent from work due to work-related 
injuries, and were awaiting determinations on pending applications for benefits under 
General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c. 
After a hearing, the ALJ determined that a past practice existed with respect to 
the Village paying employees their full salary without charging their leave accruals for 
absences occurring prior to the Village's initial determinations on the employees' GML 
§207-c applications. However, the ALJ dismissed the charge on the merits, concluding 
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that the Village's termination of the practice did not violate the Act because the Village 
had a right to revert to Article XXIV, §2(b)(4) of the parties' collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement).1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, PBA contends that the ALJ erred in her finding that no practice 
existed with respect to the Village paying employees without charging leave accruals 
after initial determinations were made on the employees' GML §207-c applications, and 
in her description of the scope of the applicable past practice. PBA also excepts to the 
ALJ's determination that the Village had the right to end the practice by reverting to the 
negotiated terms set forth in Article XXIV, §2(b)(4) of the agreement. 
The Village supports the ALJ's decision. 
Following our review of the record, and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
PBA represents a unit of full-time police officers employed by the Village of 
Mount Kisco Police Department (Department), with the exception of the Chief of Police 
(Chief). PBA and the Village are parties to an expired June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2002 
agreement, as modified by an August 2006 interest arbitration award for the period 
June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2004. The terms of the agreement, as modified by the 
arbitration award, were extended for the period June 1, 2004 through May 31, 2007 by 
a memorandum of agreement between the parties. 
Article XXIV of the agreement includes negotiated procedures with respect to 
1
 42 PERB H4531 (2009). 
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GML §207-c benefits. Article XXIV, §2(b)(4) states: "Pending the determination of an 
application for benefits, an applicant who is unable to report for work may use all 
accumulated leave credits." Section 2(c) states: "A determination shall be made by the 
Chief within thirty (30) days of the date of receipt of the application. Upon a 
determination of entitlement to disability benefits all leave credits which were deducted 
as a result of time missed which are determined to have resulted from the injury will be 
re-credited to the officer." In addition, under §2(d), an employee may appeal to the 
Village Manager the Chiefs determination of ineligibility, termination of entitlement to 
benefits, or fitness to return to full or light duty status. Section 2(d)(1) states that if an 
employee wishes to appeal the determination of the Village Manager, he or she may 
request a hearing before the Village Board or hearing officer designated by the Village 
Board within ten days of receipt of the Village Manager's determination. According to 
§2(d)(2), the final determination of the Village Board may be reviewed pursuant to 
Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
From at least 2001 until 2007, when an employee was absent from work as a 
result of a work-related injury and subsequently filed an application for GML §207-c 
benefits, the Village denoted the absence as "comp," and the Village paid the employee 
without requiring the employee to charge leave accruals for his or her absences. 
In May 2007, Lieutenant Edward Dunnigan, the Department's Administrative 
Lieutenant, told PBA President Joseph Spinelli (Spinelli) that he had been instructed by 
acting Chief Louis Terlizzi, to change the notation on the time card for unit employee 
Michael Battenfeld (Battenfeld) from "comp" to sick leave and to charge Battenfeld's 
accrued personal leave for the time he was absent while his GML §207-c application 
was pending. 
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At the hearing before the ALJ on January 29, 2008, Spinelli testified that until 
May of 2007, the Village always paid injured employees for absences without requiring 
the employees to charge their accruals. Spinelli stated that he knew of no employees 
who had exhausted the appeal process for denial. 
Village Deputy Treasurer Patti Hogan (Hogan), who was responsible for 
overseeing the processing of payments to employees, testified that she reviewed 
approximately one hundred occupational injury cases filed by unit employees from 2000 
to 2007. She found that in every instance, when an employee was absent from work 
due to a work-related injury, the employee was paid without charge to leave accruals up 
to the Village's initial determination on the employee's GML §207-c application. Hogan 
did not state whether the employees who were paid without charge to leave accruals up 
to the Village's initial determination went back to work before initial determinations were 
made on their GML §207-c applications, or upon the denial of their GML §207-c 
applications. Additionally, Hogan did not testify as to whether the Village rendered the 
initial determinations on the approximately one hundred GML §207-c applications within 
thirty days pursuant to §2(c) of the agreement. 
She found only one instance in which an employee's GML §207-c application 
was denied at the initial review, the employee remained out of work after the denial, and 
he continued to receive full pay without charge to accruals for his post-denial absences. 
Hogan testified that the employee continued to be paid by the Village because "comp" 
was indicated on the employee's time card for the dates following the denial when the 
employee remained out of work. Hogan did not indicate whether the Village reached its 
initial denial within thirty days of receipt of the employee's GML §207-c application. 
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DISCUSSION 
We begin with PBA's exception to the ALJ's finding of no past practice with 
respect to the Village paying employees without requiring them to charge leave accruals 
for absences occurring after initial denials of GML §207-c applications. 
In order to establish a binding past practice, a charging party must show that the 
"practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time 
sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the 
affected unit employees that the [practice] would continue."2 
The past practice in this case is defined by the approximately one hundred 
employees who were absent from work due to injuries sustained on the job, who 
subsequently filed applications for benefits under GML §207-c, and who were paid full 
salary without charge to leave accruals up until the Village made an initial determination 
on the GML §207-c applications. The employees were paid without charge to accruals 
over a period of approximately seven years. We find that there, was a past practice 
because it was unambiguous and uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient to create a 
reasonable expectation among unit employees that it would continue. Therefore, we 
affirm the ALJ's determination that a past practice existed whereby employees were 
paid without charge to accruals until the Village made initial determinations on their 
GML §207-c applications. However, that past practice is subject to being superseded 
by the Village's reversion to applicable contract language. 
PBA argues that the scope of the practice is broader and is not limited by the 
date when the Village rendered its initial determination or the number of times that a unit 
2
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB 1J3012, at 3046-47 (2007) (subsequent 
history omitted). 
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employee received a salary payment. It contends that the past practice is that the 
Village made salary payments to disabled unit employees without charge to their 
accruals, regardless of the status of their respective GML §207-c applications. 
According to PBA, the fact that the Village paid a single unit employee after the denial of 
his application, without charge to his leave accruals, expands the perimeter of the 
practice. 
We disagree. The standard for an enforceable past practice under the Act 
requires that the practice continue uninterrupted for a sufficient period of time. Contrary 
to PBA's contention, the single situation of a unit employee continuing to be paid 
following the initial denial of his GML §207-c application is not sufficient, under the facts 
and circumstances of the present case, to enlarge the scope of the enforceable past 
practice. In order for a practice to "continue uninterrupted," the circumstances that 
make up the practice must occur on more than one occasion. Therefore, we affirm the 
ALJ's determination that the past practice did not extend to the Village paying 
employees without requiring the employees to charge leave accruals for absences 
occurring after the denial of their GML §207-c applications. 
Significantly, PBA does not dispute that the Village has the right to revert to 
§2(b)(4) of the agreement and to require employees to charge leave accruals in order to 
be paid for absences occurring pre-initial determination. However, it argues that the 
Village's contract reversion defense applies only to the thirty-day time period during 
which the Village is contractually obligated to make its initial determination. According 
to PBA, the agreement is ambiguous as it pertains to requiring employees to charge 
leave accruals for absences occurring after their GML §207-c applications are denied. 
Therefore, PBA argues that the Village can only revert to the agreement and require 
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employees to charge accruals until either the initial determination is made or within thirty 
days from receipt of the GML §207-c application, whichever is shorter. If the 
determination is made after thirty days from receipt of the application, and the injured 
employee remains out of work after the expiration of the thirty days, or if the application 
is denied and the denial is then appealed by an employee who remains out of work, the 
right to revert does not apply. 
We have held that "where parties have reached an agreement with respect to a 
specific subject following negotiations, a party may unilaterally end a past practice 
without violating the Act by reverting to the terms of a specifically negotiated provision of 
the agreement."3 The burden rests with the respondent to plead and prove a duty 
satisfaction or contract reversion defense through negotiated terms that are reasonably 
clear on the specific subject at issue.4 Consideration of a reversion defense requires a 
determination as to the meaning of the parties' agreement through the application of 
standard principles of contract interpretation.5 If the language of the agreement is 
reasonably clear but susceptible to more than one interpretation, extrinsic evidence, 
such as negotiation history and/or a past practice, is admissible to determine the intent 
of the parties.6 
In the present case, Article XXIV, §2 of the agreement is reasonably clear on the 
3
 City of Albany, 41 PERB 1J3019, at 3090 (2008), New York City Transit Auth, 41 PERB 
P014 (2008). 
4
 New York City Transit Auth, supra note 3. New York City Transit Auth, 20 PERB 
1J3037 (1987), confirmed, NYCTA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 147 AD2d 574, 
22 PERB U7001 (2d Dept 1989); Town of Shawangunk, 32 PERB 1J3042 (1999). 
5
 County of Livingston, 30 PERB 1J3046 (1997). 
6
 New York City Transit Auth, supra note 3. 
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requirement that employees use accruals in order to receive payment for absences 
occurring while the application is pending determination. Section 2(b)(4) explicitly 
states, "pending the determination of an application for benefits, an applicant who is 
unable to report to work may use all accumulated leave credits." 
The plain language of the agreement does not support PBA's argument that the 
Village's right to revert to §2(b)(4) of the agreement is limited to either the initial 
determination or thirty days from receipt of the application, whichever is shorter. The 
agreement is silent with respect to returning disabled employees to full pay status without 
charge to leave accruals if the Village fails to render initial determinations within thirty 
days of receipt of the applications. If return to full pay status without charge to accruals 
for continued absence was the consequence bargained for by the parties, this particular 
consequence should have been explicitly stated in the agreement. Therefore, we affirm 
the ALJ's determination that there is no language in the agreement to support PBA's 
position that there are consequences for the Village's failure to render an initial 
determination within thirty days, specifically that the Village does not have the right to 
revert to the language of §2(b)(4) if the initial determination is not made within thirty days. 
We conclude, therefore, that based on the record evidence, the Village's right to 
revert to §2(b)(4) extends up to the time of the Village's initial determination, whether 
the initial determination is made within thirty days. Reversion to the agreement permits 
the Village to require employees to charge accruals up to the initial determinations, 
when made. We affirm the ALJ's determination that the Village did not violate the Act 
when it did so. 
Based upon the foregoing, PBA's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
ALJ affirmed. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 2010 
Albany, New York 
•derome Lefteo'witz, Oh^irperson 
Sheila S. Cole/Member 
